It’s Not About Syria
BY KAITY SHEA CULLEN
With Syria’s chemical arms abilities (sort of) revoked, the horrific images of the war-torn nation’s ongoing civil war have long since been removed from the televisions and minds of American citizens. But as the struggling nation approaches its third year of violence, its challenges only continue to grow. The World Health Organization is scrambling to vaccinate 2.5 million Syrian children against polio before an outbreak there is carried by refugees throughout the Middle East and into Europe. The Committee to Protect Journalists is trying to draw international attention to the 52 journalists that have been killed in Syria, and the additional 30— including Americans— that are kidnapped or missing. And for many, the harsh living conditions in refugee camps like Zaatari, where riots now occur almost daily, have made it worth the risk to return to Syria, where access to food and medical care is also increasingly limited.
Even as violence persists and families are forced to flee, neither side can claim a definitive upper hand. Regime factions, Kurdish groups, and Arab rebels each hold portions of Syrian territory and have largely reached a deadlock. The assessment from political scientists is grim, with predictions suggesting that the war will last at least another decade, and will be made longer and bloodier by foreign intervention, disunity within rebel factions, and an inability to reach a negotiated settlement. United Nations special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi is heading efforts to alter this last condition by assembling relevant leaders in Geneva, Switzerland to forge a peace agreement and establish a transitional government. But as the targeted November date for the Geneva II conference slips by, with no consensus on the goals, participants, or preconditions of the conference and with no parties committed to attending, the magnitude and breadth of Brahimi’s task is becoming increasingly troublesome.
SYRIAN FORCES
Naturally, the two most crucial parties to the peace talks are the Assad regime and the Syrian National Coalition. However, the attendance of both parties faces challenges. Assad has required that foreign support to opposition forces within Syria be terminated before peace talks take place. Most of this support has come from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, by whom Assad’s demands have been largely ignored.
For its own part, the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) has created another set of roadblocks to Geneva II. The Coalition has stated that it will participate “when the military balance has changed and the regime has demonstrated a willingness to transfer power to a transitional government with full executive powers.” With many rebel factions requiring Assad’s removal, a precondition that Damascus refuses to accept, simply getting representatives from sides in the same room has proven challenging. Ahmad Jarba, president of the SNC, has also stated that his party will not attend if Iran is present and if a ceasefire is not granted for the duration of the conference.
In addition to numerous preconditions, the opposition’s involvement is complicated by extreme disunity within the rebel faction. Eleven Islamist and jihadist opposition groups have refused to recognize the legitimacy of the SNC, which Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov further stated fails even to represent the majority of Assad’s opponents. Moreover, the SNC faces additional challenges of cohesion from within. For example, the Syrian National Council, a central part of the Coalition, initially threatened to withdraw from the organization if it agreed to attend. It ultimately relented, but not before imposing its own challenging set of preconditions, which called for new humanitarian corridors to besieged areas, as well as the release of political prisoners and the support of ground forces.
ASSAD’S SUPPORTERS: IRAN, HEZBOLLAH, AND RUSSIA
For many, the war in Syria isn’t about the Syrians. The conflict has undoubtedly turned into a proxy war among several major powers on the international stage.
Since Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979, it has maintained generally amicable relations with Syria. Today, Iran’s interest in preserving the Assad regime extends beyond the nations’ mutual opposition to Israel and the United States. Syria’s geographic location makes it an important foothold in the region and a channel for arms flow to Hezbollah in Lebanon. These advantages, compounded by Iran’s heavy investments in the nation, have made Iran a crucial supporter of the Assad regime. Iran’s increasingly dominant role in the region has led many to believe its participation in the Geneva II conference to be fitting. United Nations Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, stated that it would be difficult to reach “a solution in Syria that works if Iran isn’t somehow engaged.” Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has confirmed Iran’s interest in participating, stating that, if invited strictly without preconditions, Iran “will be there to help find a diplomatic solution.” But contention over Iran’s nuclear program continues to be a roadblock to negotiation on all issues, and despite its recent resolution at Geneva I, long-standing tensions may well continue to hinder progress on Syria.
Lebanon-based militant group Hezbollah has been another key ally of the Assad regime. United with Assad against Israeli, American, and Sunni influence, the organization has sent members to fight alongside Syrian forces. But as violence and refugees begin to spill over the border, tension within Lebanon is mounting. While some are eager to reach peace, others want the opportunity to fight it out. Twin blasts in Beirut on Tuesday, which included five at the Iranian embassy among the 24 killed, drew criticism from Russian Ambassador Alexander Zasypkin for aiming to halt the Geneva II talks. Foreign minister Adnan Mansour has insisted that he will represent Lebanon at the conference, but he does so amid domestic criticism from the anti-Assad March 14 Alliance, which insists that “if Mansour goes to Geneva ge will be representing Hezbollah and not Lebanon.”
Russia too has provided explicit and crucial support for the Assad regime. Its deep-seated alliance, which found its beginnings during the Cold War-era, finds continued strength in ongoing military cooperation, with Russia frequently providing arms to the nation that houses its only Mediterranean naval base. Russia has also struggled with Islamist militants in Chechnya, and has a vested interest in quelling similar uprisings elsewhere. Moreover, Russia has used the situation in Syria as a vehicle to express displeasure with American foreign policy and commitment to promoting their own interests within the region. Yury Ushakov, aide to Russian president Vladimir Putin, stated that Russia is working actively to make preparations for the conference, but explained that its failure to set a date stems less from frustrations in Damascus and more from “the position of certain opposition groups.”
While strife and disunity persist within and between Assad’s international supporters, he can continue to enjoy the benefits of decades-old alliances and shared interests with key players on the regional and global political stage. But with complex interests at play and few unified fronts, simply making it to Geneva II may prove an insurmountable challenge.
ASSAD’S OPPONENTS: ISRAEL, SAUDI ARABIA, AND THE UNITED STATES
Contention between Israel and Syria dates back to 1967, when Israel captured the Golan Heights from aggressor Syria during the Six Day War. While Syria has been frustrated by failed negotiations to regain the territory, a military response never materialized and Assad has established critical stability along the Syria-Israel border. Israel’s opposition to the regime therefore stems primarily from Assad’s support of Hezbollah and Hamas, which pose a more serious threat to the Jewish state, although Syrian relations with Palestinian Hamas have been tenuous since the Sunni Islamist organization backed the uprising. In fact, Israel’s only direct military involvement has been to prevent the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah. With enemies on both sides, Israel’s ideal outcome would simply be prolonged conflict and the offsetting of the Geneva II convention.
Saudi Arabia, a theocratic Sunni monarchy, has been competing with Shia Iran for regional hegemony and stands to gain from the opportunity to install Sunni leadership in Syria. A crucial regional ally of the United States, the Saudis have encouraged American military intervention and have themselves provided funding and arms to a number of rebel groups, including Islamists. Preferring military action to negotiated peace talks, Riyadh has drawn criticism for stalling the convention and encouraging the Syrian National Council to establish contentious preconditions. Saudi Arabia’s displeasure with the international response was demonstrated in mid-October when it declined a 2-year membership to the United Nations Security Council, citing the “double standards” and ineffectiveness of the organization. With a number of Saudi roadblocks in place, including its own set of preconditions calling for Assad’s resignation, it seems likely that fighting will persist in Syria.
The United States has maintained a complex relationship with Syria in recent years, sharing in anti-terrorist efforts but clashing on issues of sanctions and reform. Since the uprising, however, the CIA has been involved in training select groups of Syrian opposition forces in Jordan and encouraging Turkey and a number of Arab governments to provide aid to the rebels. Still, impactful American support for the rebels has been hindered by the prevalence of Al-Qaeda linked jihadist group Jabhat al-Nusra, the strongest force among the opposition and an enemy of Israel and other regional American allies. Nevertheless, the United States is pushing strongly for a negotiated revolution in the region, especially following the regime’s use of chemical weapons.
CHALLENGES AHEAD
If the aforementioned groups didn’t bring enough complexity to the issue, a number of other secondary players surely will. Neighboring state Jordan, which is struggling to accommodate the refugees and maintain stability, has expressed its commitment to diplomatic resolution and refused to facilitate American military intervention. Turkey, also affected by the influx of refugees, has provided aid to the rebels. But amid frustration with the lack of clear U.S. policy on Syria, Turkish prime minister Racep Tayyip Erdogan has indicated his intention to engage with Iran and Iraq to find a solution in Syria. Iraq, too, has been strained by the flood of displaced Syrians, and while Iraqi militants have stepped in to support the Assad regime abroad, the nation has been preoccupied by increasing violence and instability within its borders. Western ally Qatar has provided support for the rebels, while Russian and Iranian ally China has called for a diplomatic solution at Geneva II.
The Syrian conflict is no longer about Syria. Everybody— states, parties, and militant groups, each with competing interests and internal strife— seems have a stake in the outcome. And as the date for Geneva II continues to be moved and missed, and the situation within the country continues to deteriorate, the chances for peaceful negotiation seem to be slipping away. For now, the future of Syria seems to hold continued bloodshed and destruction.